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I. INTRODUCTION
My assignment is to comment on the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Panetti
v. Quartennan,1 holding that a delusional mentally ill prisoner who is aware that
the State intends to execute him based on his conviction for a capital crime is not,
based on that finding alone, competent for execution under the Eighth
Amendment. In so doing, the Court rejected the contrary position taken by the
Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. Does this obscure
ruling carry any freight? It has all the earmarks of a one-off end-of-term decision
with little significance for anyone other than a few very ill condemned prisoners: it
deals with an issue that arises rarely, is doctrinally narrow, and has little
connection with other domains of criminal or constitutional jurisprudence.
Indeed, most Court-watchers probably view Panetti as just another in the
unending series of 5-4 decisions by a polarized Supreme Court that will continue,
like the federal budget deficit, well into the twenty-first century. In this context,
Panetti also confirms Justice Anthony Kennedy's personal prerogative, as the
"swing vote" on this otherwise evenly divided Court, to declare the "supreme law
of the land" as well as his predilection for doing so in a "minimalist" manner.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice Thomas's dissent
document the argumentative style (the Justices, like the parties, agree on nothing)
that has become commonplace in the Court's decisions. Perhaps Panetti v.
Quarterman does not warrant our attention at all.
To the contrary, the Panetti litigation highlights two deeply troubling
problems in death penalty adjudication. First, it exposes the utter failure of the
criminal justice system to take adequate account of the effects of severe mental
illness in capital cases, specifically by failing to assure a fair defense for
defendants with mental disabilities, by failing to give morally appropriate
mitigating effect to claims of diminished responsibility at the time of the crime,
and by failing to correct these deficiencies in post-conviction proceedings.
Indifference to claims of incompetence on the eve of execution is only the last link
in a long chain of indifference and neglect.
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The problems associated with mental illness and the death penalty have
become so widely recognized that the American Bar Association, the American
Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National
Alliance on Mental Illness have been moved to adopt identical resolutions aiming
to assure fair treatment of individuals with mental disabilities in capital cases.2
These resolutions urge legislatures and courts to preclude death sentences for
defendants who meet specified criteria of diminished responsibility, to assure that
post-conviction proceedings in capital cases are suspended when the severely
disturbed prisoner's personal participation is needed for a fair resolution of the
issues, and to prevent execution of prisoners whose capacity to appreciate the
natlr. and t rpose of the punishment is significantly impaired. The Supreme
Court's decision in Panetti, however closely divided and obscure, will reinforce
the importance and urgency of these initiatives. Although his opinion does not
mention these developments, I suspect that Justice Kennedy was well aware of this
wider political context of the Panetti decision.
The second problem highlighted by the Panetti litigation is the futility of the
Supreme Court's post-Furman3 capital sentencing jurisprudence. The death
penalty defense bar may draw some hope from its success in delaying Panetti's
execution. However, the Panetti litigation, seen in its entirety, illustrates the
unwillingness of the Texas courts to take the necessary steps to assure the
"heightened need for reliability" in capital adjudications. Ultimately the success of
the Court's post-Furman project depends upon serious and sustained efforts by
state appellate courts to implement the Eighth Amendment principles and values
enunciated by the Supreme Court for the last three decades. The Panetti record
2 See ABA Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, Recommendation and
Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 668 (2006). The Resolution was developed by the ABA Task Force on Mental
Disability and the Death Penalty, established by the ABA's Section on Individual Rights and
Responsibilities and was approved in identical position statements adopted by the respective mental
health organizations. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY IN
CAPITAL SENTENCING (2004), available at
http://www.psych.org/edu/otherres/libarchives/archives/200406.pdf; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DEATH SENTENCES FOR PERSONS wITH DEMENTIA OR TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY (2005),
available at http://www.psych.org/edu/otherres/libarchives/archives/200508.pdf; AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS ON DEATH Row (2005), available at
http://www.psych.org/edu/other-res/libarchives/archives/200505.pdf. See also American
Psychological Association, Excerpt from the Council of Representatives 2005 Meeting Minutes (Feb.
18-20, 2005); American Psychological Association, Excerpt from the Council of Representatives
2006 Meeting Minutes (Feb. 17-19, 2006). I am obliged to disclose that I served on the ABA Task
Force and was the principal architect of the portions of the Task Force Report relating to mentally ill
prisoners (paragraph 3 of the resolution). See Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death
Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1169 (2005). I should also
disclose that I participated in the drafting of the amicus brief submitted in support of Panetti by the
three mental health organizations. See Brief for American Psychological Association et al., as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407).
3 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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reveals how unwilling the Texas courts have been to do so (and they are, sadly, not
alone), and how difficult it has become for federal courts to vindicate the values of
the Eighth Amendment.
My commentary will proceed as follows: First, I will review the proceedings
at trial, documenting the remarkable failure of the Texas courts to protect the
dignity of the criminal process and assure a fair trial. Then I will turn to the
litigation regarding Panetti's competence for execution, commenting on the
impediments to federal court review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and then exploring the Court's holding on the
merits and its rationale, as explained by Justice Kennedy. After setting forth my
own views about the most persuasive grounding for the ban against executing
incompetent prisoners, I will close by locating the Panetti decision in its larger
context.
II. PANETITI'S COMPETENCE AT TRiAL
It is painful to read the record in Panetti's case.4 His lengthy history of severe
mental illness is well-documented. He had been involuntarily committed to
psychiatric hospitals in Texas and Wisconsin more than a dozen times during the
decade preceding the crime. The recurrent diagnoses were chronic schizophrenia
and schizoaffective disorder, characterized by tangential and circumstantial
thinking, hallucinations, delusions, grandiosity and paranoia, with acute psychotic
exacerbations complicated by alcohol use. Over time, his paranoid delusions
became more pronounced. Throughout this long period of chronic illness, there
was no suggestion of malingering. Even after his arrest, the psychiatrist who
evaluated his competence to stand trial (in November, 1992) acknowledged
Panetti's "chronic delusions, occasional hallucinations and an odd fragmentation of
his personality," while concluding that he understood the charges against him and
"appeared to be able to assist in his own defense and to process the information
and questions given to him" in the course of two interviews. 5
Some people with chronic schizophrenia and other major mental disorders
have sufficient capacity to assist in their own defense in a criminal adjudication
despite significant cognitive impairments, and it may be fair to proceed with the
prosecution in such cases as long as defense counsel is aware of the defendant's
impairments and is able to carry out his or her own tasks adequately. It appears
clear, however, that Panetti's thought disorder was so severe that, even with
medication, he was unable to communicate rationally with his lawyers, one of
4 See Brief of Petitioner, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407)
[hereinafter, Brief of Petitioner]; Joint Appendix, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (No. 06-
6407) [hereinafter, Joint Appendix].
5 Joint Appendix, supra note 4, Vol. I at 9.
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whom later testified that he had never had a meaningful and rational conversation
with Panetti about the legal issues in the case.6
Panetti's lawyers had little choice except to challenge his competence to
proceed. Under Texas law, competency proceedings are held before a jury.7 After
hearing the opposing testimony of two psychiatrists, the jury deadlocked at 9-3 in
favor of finding Panetti incompetent, and the judge declared a mistrial. After a
change in venue, Panetti was found to be competent at a second competence trial.8
Seven months later, Panetti experienced what he called an "April Fool's Day
revelation" that God had cured his schizophrenia, and he suddenly stopped taking
his anti-psychotic medication. 9 His already severe condition worsened. Most
significantly, his paranoid ideation .wept hi lawyers into the zone of sspicion
and distrust, and he eventually sought to fire them and represent himself under
Faretta v. California.'0 His attorneys vehemently objected. Although the federal
habeas record is sketchy, it appears that the trial judge did not hold a hearing on
Panetti's competence to proceed to trial, with or without counsel, and allowed him
to waive his right to counsel and represent himself.
Even if Panetti had been marginally able to assist counsel a year earlier, it
seems highly doubtful that he was able to do so at this point--his abilities to
communicate rationally and to exercise judgment were substantially impaired by
paranoid delusions and by pervasive cognitive confusion. Notwithstanding the
jury's previous finding that Panetti was competent, the trial court has a continuing
constitutional obligation to reconsider the question based on the defendant's
condition and behavior." At the very least, the trial court should have suspended
the proceedings to allow an inpatient evaluation of Panetti's competence to stand
trial. However, even if Panetti remained competent to proceed to trial with
counsel, he appears to have lacked the capacity to make a rational decision
regarding self-representation and to make the decisions required of a defendant
representing himself in a capital prosecution; indeed, his fragile mental and
emotional condition seems to have worsened as the trial went on. He lacked a
"rational understanding" of the very task of self-representation and of the decisions
that he was called on to make because he did not appreciate their significance or
consequences. Yet, without even seeking further evaluation or holding a new
hearing, the trial judge ruled that Panetti was competent to waive counsel and
represent himself, and the trial went forward.
The Supreme Court record includes two of the documents submitted in the
first federal habeas proceedings-affidavits by Scott Monroe, Panetti's stand-by
6 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 4, at 7.
7 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.051(a) (1965).
8 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 4, at 9.
9 Id. at 10.
'0 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
11 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-73 (1975).
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counsel at his trial, and Dr. Wolfgang Selck, a psychiatrist who had treated Panetti
when he was hospitalized in 1986 and who observed him at his trial in 1992.12
Taken together, these affidavits show, as Monroe put it, that Panetti's "trial was
truly a judicial farce, and a mockery of self-representation. It should have never
been allowed to happen .. ,'3 For example, Panetti sent all the files prepared by
counsel to his family in Wisconsin to keep the jail guards form seeing them, and
never looked at them; he subpoenaed more than 200 witnesses, including Jesus
Christ, John F. Kennedy and other dead people; he completely ignored the
annotated materials on the law prepared by Monroe; he paid little attention to jury
selection; and he never took advantage of the occasional "pow-wows" granted by
the court to enable him to consult with Monroe, choosing instead to smoke a
cigar. 1 4 Panetti put on no case in mitigation whatsoever, notwithstanding his
history of mental illness and the availability of many witnesses who could testify
about the effects of his illness, and the deterioration of his condition.
Panetti's behavior at his trial was bizarre, to put it mildly. He dressed in
cowboy garb, spoke in a TV western vernacular, and behaved as if he were acting
in a drama. When he testified, he assumed the personality of" Sarge" and "recalled
in [a] trance-like state, the details of the shooting, reciting what happened in the
third person as a dialogue"-1 5-- the "testimony" was so bizarre that even the trial
judge was prompted to say, "Mr. Panetti, let's stop.' 16 To anyone who has any
understanding of the debilitating effects of severe mental illness and any respect
for the dignity of the judicial process, this must have been a painful and distressing
spectacle. As Dr. Selck observed, Panetti "literally enjoyed the spectacle of the
Courtroom where he was the center of attention and was being allowed to act like
an attorney."1 7 Sadly, though, he "was acting out a role of an attorney as a facet of
the mental illness, not a rational decision to represent himself at trial."'18 For Dr.
Selck, Panetti's rambling speech and bizarre behavior "reflected a break from
reality" and provided clear evidence of mental illness.19 However, he observed, "I
suspect that the members of the jury.., saw Scott and thought he was normal and
pretending to be mentally ill," 20 in support of an insanity plea. Is it any wonder
that a jury would show little sympathy for a self-absorbed defendant mocking the
court by pretending to be mentally ill?
12 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 4, at 16-17.
13 Monroe Aff., Joint Appendix, supra note 4, Vol. I at 15.
14 Joint Appendix, supra note 4, Vol. I at 23.
15 Id.
16 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 4, at 9.
17 Selck Aff., Joint Appendix, supra note 4, Vol. I at 29.
" Id. at 32.
'9 Id. at 37.
20 Id. at 34-35.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
Courts trivialize mental illness, disserve the important principle of autonomy
protected by Faretta, and compromise the dignity of the law when they allow
defendants as disturbed as Panetti to represent themselves in criminal trials. It is
horrifying that judges would allow such a spectacle in a capital trial-even if the
defendant fails to recognize that his behavior imperils his life, the courts should
have no such illusions. How could they allow this?
One possible answer is that they think the Supreme Court has required them
to do so. The problem may lie in the Court's misguided 1993 decision in Godinez
v. Moran,2' holding that a defendant who has been found to be competent to stand
trial is also competent to plead guilty and to waive counsel. As I have discussed
el. ewhere 22 the is-me raised in GndinPz wn. nreqented to the Court in a misleading
way--i.e., whether the test for competence to plead guilty was "higher than" the
test for competence to stand trial-and the Court went out of its way to emphasize
that there is only one test for competence to proceed in a criminal case.
The Court was right about the typical case. As long as the unitary test for
adjudicative competence encompasses the capacity to make informed decisions, as
the Godinez decision implies, then there should be no difference between the tests
for pleading guilty or going to trial. The important issue in those contexts is a
readiness to reopen the question of competence whenever the defendant's behavior
raises a good faith doubt about his or her capacity, even on the eve of trial or at the
time of a plea. All of this is consistent with the Court's decision in Godinez.
Where the Court went astray in Godinez, however, is in ruling that a
defendant who is competent to assist counsel is, ipso facto, competent to proceed
without counsel or to make other consequential decisions over counsel's objection.
In these contexts, it is not enough that the defendant has an adequate understanding
of the charges and proceedings and that he is able to communicate rationally with
counsel and make informed decisions. The measure of capacity should be more
particularized in this context, taking into account the stakes of proceeding without
counsel and the jeopardy to which the unrepresented defendant is exposed.23
Accordingly, to use the language of Dusky v. United States,24 the defendant must
have a "rational as well as factual understanding" of the potential consequences
(risks and benefits) of the specific decision. If he does not, he may simultaneously
be competent to proceed to trial with the assistance of counsel, but not to waive
counsel and represent himself. This approach has the advantage of allowing the
criminal process to continue in cases where the defendant is competent to
understand the proceedings and to assist counsel while avoiding the morally
troubling outcomes produced when severely disturbed defendants are allowed to
21 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
22 Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47
U. MIAMi L. REv. 539, 587-93 (1993).
23 Id. at 567-87.
24 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
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represent themselves or otherwise undermine their best legal interests. 25 Respect
for autonomy under Faretta does not require the courts to allow defendants as
disturbed as Panetti to dig their own graves.
It is gruesomely ironic that, less than two months after Panetti was sentenced
to death, the trial court found him incompetent to waive the appointment of
counsel to represent him in post-conviction proceedings. Thus, a severely
disturbed capital defendant was allowed to forsake at trial every legal protection
afforded by the law, including his right to counsel, while his desire to proceed pro
se thereafter was overridden. Is it too cynical to attribute the trial court's otherwise
puzzling decisions to a desire to secure a death sentence and then to insulate it
from reversal in post-conviction review? Whatever the explanation, the death
sentence was undisturbed on collateral review by both the state and federal courts
in the face of claims that Panetti had been incompetent to stand trial or to waive his
right to counsel and represent himself.
III. FEDERAL JURISDICTION To CONSIDER THE FORD CLAIM
After the conviction and sentence were upheld on collateral review, the trial
court set an execution date, and Panetti filed a motion to stay the execution on the
ground that he was incompetent to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright.26 After
that motion was denied, Panetti filed a second federal habeas petition raising his
Ford claim. When the federal court took up the matter several months later (after
the state court had rejected a renewed Ford motion), the State claimed that the
federal court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Panetti's Ford claim. The State
relied on 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), which requires dismissal of"a claim presented in
a second or successive habeas corpus application ... that was not presented in a
prior application" except under certain, narrow circumstances not applicable
here.27
It is clearly established, as the State conceded, that a Ford claim is not ripe for
adjudication until an execution date has been set, and it would have been
premature for Panetti to raise it in his first federal habeas petition. Thus, the
State's argument was that Panetti's failure to raise an admittedly premature claim
in his first habeas petition should forever bar the federal courts from vindicating
his constitutional right not to be executed while incompetent. On the face of it,
this argument is hard to take seriously. Its practical effect would be to force all
prisoners under sentences of death to include pro forma Ford claims in their state
and federal habeas petitions in order to preserve them for later review in the event
25 The most pertinent illustration of the problem is when a capital defendant instructs counsel
to refrain from introducing mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital case. See Richard
J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REv. 1363 (1988).
26 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars states "from carrying
out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane").
27 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2000).
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that a plausible question actually arises, and to require the courts to dispose of
these unripe, and usually meritless, claims. Even worse, it would foreclose valid
execution-competence claims on behalf of prisoners whose habeas lawyers were
(blamelessly) unaware of the peculiar obligation to raise a claim prematurely
(perhaps years prematurely and with no present factual basis) in order to avoid
forfeiting it.
Why did the Court take the State's argument seriously? The argument "has
some force,"28 Justice Kennedy acknowledged, because the language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2) (2000) literally bars consideration of any claim that was not raised in
Panetti's first habeas petition and provides no exception for presently unripe
claims.29 Indeed, the argument was thought to have persuasive force by the four
Panetti dissenters who regarded the "plain meaning" of the statute to be
controlling.3 °
Fortunately, the majority was willing to see a latent ambiguity in the statutory
language and concluded that Congress "did not intend the provisions of AEDPA
addressing 'second or successive' petitions" to apply "to a Ford claim brought in
an application filed when the claim is first ripe., 31 As Justice Kennedy pointed out,
the AEDPA restriction on "second or successive" federal habeas petitions was
designed to protect the finality of state court judgments regarding conviction and
sentence and was not intended to preclude the filing of a petition relating to the
vindication of federal constitutional rights that arise at the time of execution.32
Thus, he noted, "we are hesitant to construe a statute, implemented to further the
principles of comity, finality, and federalism, in a manner that would require
unripe (and, often, factually unsupported) claims to be raised as a mere formality,
to the benefit of no party."
33
It is both perplexing and disturbing that four justices were prepared to hold
that the federal courts have no jurisdiction under the AEDPA to adjudicate a Ford
claim that was presented to the state and federal courts only after the claim became
ripe for adjudication. Justice Thomas's wooden reasoning so thoroughly ignores
the context and consequences of the result it reaches that it can be explained only
by utter indifference to the values at stake in Ford claims and a rigid adherence to
a misguided view of statutory interpretation.
28 Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2852 (2007).
29 See id. at 2855.
30 Id. at 2867.
31 Id. at 2855.
32 Id. at 2854.
33 Id. at 2855.
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IV. DEFERENCE TO THE STATE COURT DECISION UNDER THE AEDPA
Panetti filed his first Ford motion in state court on December 9, 2003.14 It
was accompanied by several lengthy affidavits, including two from habeas
counsel, attesting to Panetti's severe symptoms of mental illness over the past few
years.35 The state court denied the motion on December 23, on the ground that
Panetti had "failed to set forth alleged facts in support of the assertion that [he] is
presently incompetent.' 36 On February 4, at the direction of the federal district
court, Panetti sought renewed consideration of his motion by the state court and
accompanied the motion with affidavits from a forensic clinical psychologist and a
law professor who both had observed Panetti in recent days and concluded that he
was experiencing delusions that prevented him from understanding why he was
being executed.
After concluding that Panetti had now made "a substantial showing of
incompetency," within the meaning of the governing state statute, the state judge
appointed two mental health experts to evaluate Panetti.37 In their joint report,
filed on April 28, they opined that, even though Panetti had declined to answer
their questions during the interview, he "has the ability to understand the reason he
is to be executed" and is competent to be executed.38 Panetti's counsel thereafter
filed numerous objections to the methods and conclusions of the court-appointed
experts, renewed his previous motions for appointment of counsel and funds to
hire a defense expert, and requested a hearing. However, on May 26, without
either scheduling argument on the defense motions or holding a hearing, the state
court denied the motions and ruled that Panetti had failed to show that he was
incompetent. 39 No appeal was available to Panetti under state law.
There are two major hurdles for state prisoners in federal habeas litigation.
One is getting the federal courts to address the merits of claims that were not raised
at trial.4 ° (At least that is one hurdle Panetti did not have to overcome; even Texas
did not argue that an execution competence claim had to be preserved at trial to
avoid forfeiture.) The second is overcoming the strong deference given to state
court judgments. Here, the state trial court had found that Panetti had "failed to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is incompetent to be
executed. 41 The federal courts are obliged to defer to this judgment unless the
state court proceedings "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
34 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 4, at 2.
31 Id. at 3.
36 Id. at 50.
7 Id. at 50.
38 Id. at 21.
'9 Id. at 4.
40 Id. at 5.
41 Id. at21.
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unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States" or "was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court
proceedings. 42
In order to escape the state court's judgment, Panetti had two possible lines of
attack, both stemming from Ford, the sole applicable decision of the United States
Supreme Court. The first was substantive-that the state court finding rested
(implicitly, since the state court never explained its ruling) on a clearly mistaken
application of the substantive rule announced in Ford. In effect, Panetti would
have to persuade the Supreme Court not only that the Fifth Circuit's definition of
competence to be executed, first enunciated in Barnard v Collins,43 was erroneous,
but also that it was contrary to law "clearly established" in Ford.
Panetti's brief argues that an inmate must have a "rational understanding" of
the reason for the execution under any of the rationales for the common-law rule
against executing the incompetent that had been constitutionalized in Ford.44 The
legal historians' amicus brief makes a similar argument.45 This might be the best
reading of Ford, but it cannot be said that it is the only plausible reading. Neither
the Ford plurality opinion by Justice Marshall, nor Justice Powell's concurring
opinion, articulated a "rational understanding" standard, and the scattered
common-law precedents and commentaries acknowledge the ban against executing
"insane" prisoners but provide no reference to any particular "test." The one thing
about Ford that is clear is that no test was announced.
Panetti's second line of attack on the state court judgment is based on the
Supreme Court's procedural due process ruling in Ford, which invalidated
Florida's gubernatorial decision-making process for deciding whether a
condemned prisoner is insane. Federal district court judge Sparks was persuaded
that the state court's refusal to give Panetti an opportunity to contest the court-
ordered examiners' joint opinion or to obtain an opinion by another expert "fl[ew]
in the face of... Ford... [where] seven Justices of the Supreme Court concluded
[that] denying a petitioner the right to present, as well as rebut, evidence in making
a competency-to-be-executed determination violates the right to due process. 46
Judge Sparks also concluded that the state court's failure to hold a hearing (as
required under state law) erased the duty to defer to the resulting finding under a
previous Fifth Circuit interpretation of Ford. Justice Kennedy embraced judge
Sparks's approach 47 to the AEDPA:
42 28 U.S.C. § 2245(d) (2000).
41 13 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 1994).
44 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 4, at 29.
45 Brief of Legal Historians at 16, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-
6407).
46 Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp.2d 702, 705 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
47 Because the Fifth Circuit affirmed judge Sparks's decision denying Panetti's claim on the
merits, it did not address the AEDPA issue.
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We agree with petitioner that no deference is due. The state court's
failure to provide the procedures mandated by Ford constituted an
unreasonable application of clearly established law as determined by this
Court. It is uncontested that petitioner made a substantial showing of
incompetency. This showing entitled him to, among other things, an
adequate means by which to submit expert psychiatric evidence in
response to the evidence that had been solicited by the state court. And it
is clear from the record that the state court reached its competency
determination after failing to provide petitioner with this process,
notwithstanding counsel's sustained effort, diligence, and compliance
with court orders. As a result of this error, our review of petitioner's
underlying incompetency claim is unencumbered by the deference
AEDPA normally requires ....
The state court failed to provide petitioner with a
constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard. After a prisoner has
made the requisite threshold showing, Ford requires, at a minimum, that
a court allow a prisoner's counsel the opportunity to make an adequate
response to evidence solicited by the state court. In petitioner's case this
meant an opportunity to submit psychiatric evidence as a counterweight
to the report filed by the court-appointed experts. Yet petitioner failed to
48
receive even this rudimentary process.
The four dissenters insisted that the state court ruling was entitled to
deference. The dissent implicitly acknowledged that the state court procedures
would have been contrary to "clearly established law," if the governing law in
Ford had appeared in Justice Marshall's opinion for the plurality-that opinion
endorses the need for trial-type procedures for execution competence
adjudications, and would require access to mental health assistance, a right to
contest the state-provided exam, and the right to a hearing. However, the
dissenters insisted that Justice Powell's pivotal concurring opinion did not clearly
require either judicial decision-making or adversarial procedures. Thus, the
disagreement in Panetti turns exclusively on whether the procedures provided by
the Texas court reflected an "unreasonable application" of "clearly established
law" as stated in Justice Powell's separate opinion in Ford.
So, what this disagreement between Justices Kennedy and Thomas appears to
boil down to is (i) the correct interpretation of Justice Powell's concurring opinion
in Ford and (ii) whether an expansive understanding could be said to have been
"clearly established" by Powell himself before Justice Kennedy said so in Panetti.
This exercise amounts to reading Justice Powell's mind when he wrote his separate
opinion in Ford in 1986. It is doubtful that the votes of any of the nine justices
actually turned on such an indeterminate inquiry. What seems most likely is that at
least one vote (Justice Kennedy's), and perhaps more, turned on the justices'
48 Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2855 (2007).
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annoyance at the trial judge's demonstrable failure to take the Ford claim
seriously. Justice Kennedy's characterization of the trial judge's inadequate
treatment of the claim clearly demonstrates his irritation:
The state court refused to transcribe its proceedings,
notwithstanding the multiple motions petitioner filed requesting this
process. To the extent a more complete record may have put some of the
court's actions in a more favorable light, this only constitutes further
evidence of the inadequacy of the proceedings. Based on the materials
available to this Court, it appears the state court on repeated occasions
conveyed information to petitioner's counsel that turned out not to be
true; provided at least one significant update to the State without
providing the same notice to petitioner; and failed in general to keep
petitioner informed as to the opportunity, if any, he would have to
present his case. There is also a strong argument the court violated state
law by failing to provide a competency hearing. If this did, in fact,
constitute a violation of the procedural framework Texas has mandated
for the adjudication of incompetency claims, the violation undermines
any reliance the State might now place on Justice Powell's assertion that
"the States should have substantial leeway to determine what process
best balances the various interests at stake."...
The state court made an additional error, one that Ford makes clear
is impermissible under the Constitution: It failed to provide petitioner
with an adequate opportunity to submit expert evidence in response to
the report filed by the court-appointed experts. The court mailed the
experts' report to both parties in the first week of May. The report,
which rejected the factual basis for petitioner's claim, set forth new
allegations suggesting that petitioner's bizarre behavior was due, at least
in part, to deliberate design rather than mental illness. Petitioner's
counsel reached the reasonable conclusion that these allegations
warranted a response. On May 14 the court told petitioner's counsel, by
letter, to file "any other matters you wish to have considered" within a
week. Petitioner, in response, renewed his motions for an evidentiary
hearing, funds to hire a mental health expert, and other relief. He did not
submit at that time expert psychiatric evidence to challenge the court-
appointed experts' report, a decision that in context made sense: The
court had said it would rule on his outstanding motions, which included a
request for funds to hire a mental-health expert and a request for an
evidentiary hearing, once the court-appointed experts had completed
their evaluation. Counsel was justified in relying on this representation
by the court.
Texas law, moreover, provides that a court's finding of
incompetency will be made on the basis of, inter alia, a "final
competency hearing." . . . Had the court advised counsel it would resolve
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the case without first ruling on petitioner's motions and without holding
a competency hearing, petitioner's counsel might have managed to
procure the assistance of experts, as he had been able to do on apro bono
basis the day before petitioner's previously scheduled execution. It was,
in any event, reasonable for counsel to refrain from procuring and
submitting expert psychiatric evidence while waiting for the court to rule
on the timely filed motions, all in reliance on the court's assurances.
But at this point the court simply ended the matter.4 9
The trial court's failure to take Panetti's Ford claim seriously does not seem
to have bothered Justice Thomas and his dissenting companions. Their opinion
reflects a strong predisposition to defer to state court judgments, almost no matter
how sloppy they may have been. What the majority characterizes as arbitrary and
inconsiderate judicial conduct is seen by Justice Thomas as a lack of vigilance by
counsel. This disagreement is likely grounded in strongly divergent views
regarding the importance of the individual interest protected by Ford.
V. THE HOLDING ON PANETTI'S FORD CLAIM
The starting point for addressing Panetti's claim on the merits is Justice
Powell's observation in Ford that the Eighth Amendment "forbids the execution
only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why
they are to suffer it."' 50 Justice Kennedy summarized the interpretation of Ford that
guided the Court of Appeals as follows:
[T]he Court of Appeals identified the relevant District Court findings as
follows: first, petitioner is aware that he committed the murders; second,
he is aware that he will be executed; and, third, he is aware that the
reason the State has given for the execution is his commission of the
crimes in question. Under Circuit precedent this ends the analysis as a
matter of law; for the Court of Appeals regards these three factual
findings as necessarily demonstrating that a prisoner is aware of the
reason for his execution.5'
That holding, Justice Kennedy concluded, "rests on a flawed interpretation of
Ford:"
Circuit precedent required the District Court to disregard evidence of
psychological dysfunction that . . . may have resulted in petitioner's
"fundamental failure to appreciate the connection between the
49 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2856-58 (internal citations omitted).
50 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986).
51 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2860 (internal citations omitted).
269
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
petitioner's crime and his execution." To refuse to consider evidence of
this nature is to mistake Ford's holding and its logic. Gross delusions
stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link
between a crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from
reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose. It is therefore
error to derive from Ford, and the substantive standard for incompetency
its opinions broadly identify, a strict test for competency that treats
delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware the State has
identified the link between his crime and the punishment to be inflicted.52
While rejecting the standard followed by the Court of Appeals, Justice
Kennedy declined "to attempt to set down a rule governing all competency
determinations" until Panetti's claims could be further developed on remand.53
On first reading, I found myself lamenting the Court's failure, once again, to
embrace a substantive test of competence for execution. Another illustration of
minimalist circumlocution by a justice who wants to decide no more than what is
absolutely required to decide the case before him, I thought. However, upon
further reflection, I have come to the view that by rejecting the "thin" test of
incompetence deployed by the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided the most
important issue, and signaled its likely support for a test of "rational
understanding" without tying its hands in ways that it might regret in future cases.
The fundamental problem with the Fifth Circuit's approach is that it fails to take
account of the morally relevant clinical realities of severe mental illness,
particularly the distortions of the mentally ill person's understanding of the
meaning of his own behavior, as perceived by others, and of the meaning of, and
motivation for, other people's behavior.
In this regard, Justice Kennedy's approach maps nicely onto the distinctions
that courts have drawn in other contexts between "factual" understanding and
"rational understanding" (competence to stand trial)54 or between "knowing"
something to have been illegal and "appreciating its wrongfulness" (criminal
responsibility).55 Purely formal understanding of the kind demonstrated by Panetti
requires no more than the ability to articulate a semantic connection ("people who
are convicted of crimes are sent to prison or executed"). However, psychotic
decompensation associated with severe mental illness can leave such a formal
52 Id. at 2862 (internal citations omitted).
53 Id.
54 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). For further discussion of the meaning and
assessment of"rational understanding' in criminal defendants, see Bonnie, supra note 22, at 539, and
NORMAN POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES (2002).
55 See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN THE
INSANITY DEFENSE (2000).
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understanding intact, while erasing or distorting a person's ability to recognize the
meaning and significance of his behavior and the behavior of others.56
It is important to emphasize, as Justice Kennedy properly does, that the Ford
prohibition aims to exempt only people with severe mental illness. In what may
turn out to be one of the most important passages in the opinion, he highlights the
critical distinction between severe mental disorders characterized by psychotic
features and character pathology, most notably psychopathy:
[W]e must not ignore the concern that some prisoners, whose cases are
not implicated by this decision, will fail to understand why they are to be
punished on account of reasons other than those stemming from a severe
mental illness. The mental state requisite for competence to suffer
capital punishment neither presumes nor requires a person who would be
considered "normal," or even "rational," in a layperson's understanding
of those terms. Someone who is condemned to death for an atrocious
murder may be so callous as to be unrepentant; so self-centered and
devoid of compassion as to lack all sense of guilt; so adept in transferring
blame to others as to be considered, at least in the colloquial sense, to be
out of touch with reality. Those states of mind, even if extreme
compared to the criminal population at large, are not what petitioner
contends lie at the threshold of a competence inquiry. The beginning of
doubt about competence in a case like petitioner's is not a misanthropic
personality or an amoral character. It is a psychotic disorder.
5 7
The psychopathic offender lacks the capacity for moral cognition and may
not, for that reason, understand the moral connection between his wrongdoing and
the punishment he is about to suffer. However, such an offender does have the
capacity to understand that society draws that connection, and that he is being
punished because society condemns the conduct for which he was convicted. Such
cases are fundamentally different, in both clinical and moral terms, from cases, like
Panetti's, in which the offender's patently false beliefs about official motivations
for his impending execution are rooted in psychotic delusions.
VI. WHY NOT EXECUTE AN INCOMPETENT PRISONER?
To say that the Court's decision takes account of the clinical realities of
severe mental illness is not necessarily to say that it is the most sensible
56 See generally, Paul S. Applebaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to
Consent to Treatment, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1635 (1988); Richard J. Bonnie, Morality, Equality,
and Expertise: Renegotiating the Relationship Between Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 12 BULL.
AM. AcAD. PSYHCIATRY & L. 5, 6 (1984).
17 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862.
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application of the Eighth Amendment.5 8 To put it bluntly, maybe a "thin" criterion
of competence is adequate to protect the values at stake in execution competence
adjudications, while the "thicker" criterion, however it might be defined, would
needlessly increase the costs of administering the death penalty. Why, exactly, is
the Fifth Circuit's test undesirable? In order to answer this question, it is necessary
to go back to the holding in Ford itself. Why does the prisoner's mental condition
at the time of the execution matter?59
In Ford, Justice Marshall set forth various rationales to which common-law
authorities had referred, including recognition that "the execution of an insane
person simply offends humanity," that it "provides no example to others," that "it
is uncharitable to dispatch an offender into another world, when he is not of a
capacity to fit himself for it," that "madness is its own punishment," and that
executing an insane person serves no retributive purpose.60  He then made the
following observations about the contemporary grounding of the ancient ban:
[T]oday, no less than before, we may seriously question the retributive
value of executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has
been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life ...
Similarly, the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one
who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity is
still vivid today. And the intuition that such an execution simply offends
humanity is evidently shared across this Nation. Faced with such
widespread evidence of a restriction upon sovereign power, this Court is
compelled to conclude that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from
carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane. Whether
its aim be to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort
of understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the
barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds
enforcement in the Eighth Amendment.6'
58 I am assuming for this purpose, as the Court did, that Panetti was competent to be tried and
was responsible at the time of the offense. I am also assuming that his incapacity during the post-
conviction process was not an impediment to a fair adjudication of his habeas claims.
59 During the process of drafting the amicus brief for the various mental health associations,
discussed in note 2, supra, members of the drafting team expressed concern about the persuasiveness
of the argument being made for the "rational understanding standard" because the argument was not
grounded in any legal argument about Ford or the Eighth Amendment. The argument was a bare
claim that the Fifth Circuit's test failed to take account of the clinical realities of severe mental
illness. The brief made no effort to go back and connect the dots between "rational understanding"
and the rationale for the Ford rule. However, this would have been a difficult task because it would
have required a theory about the reason for the Ford prohibition itself
60 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407-08 (1986).
61 Id. at 409.
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It was not necessary for the Ford Court to settle on any particular rationale
since it needed to do nothing more than proclaim that the common-law prohibition
is embedded in the Eighth Amendment. If the common-law courts and authorities
had also embraced a particular criterion for incompetence to be executed, then it
might follow that this definition is also embedded in the Eighth Amendment,
without drawing the Court into any deeper exploration of the rationale for the
prohibition than it undertook in Ford itself. However, this path was not open to
the Court in Panetti because, as the legal historians' brief clearly documented, no
definition of incompetence for execution was enunciated by the common-law
authorities.62 Inevitably, then, in order to articulate a substantive constitutional
standard, the Panetti Court needed to explore the rationales for the ban, as viewed
through the lens of "the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society. 63
Justice Kennedy took retribution as his starting point64 when he began to
explore the compatibility of the Fifth Circuit's test with Ford:
Considering .. .whether retribution is served[,] it might be said that
capital punishment is imposed because it has the potential to make the
offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime and to allow the
community as a whole, including the surviving family and friends of the
victim, to affirm its own judgment that the culpability of the prisoner is
so serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed. The
62 Brief of Legal Historians at 5, Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (No. 06-6407) ("History reveals no
precise definitions or uniform standards used at common law to determine mental competency.").
63 Justice Kennedy's failure to explain why he focused the analysis on retribution highlights
the lack of a methodological clarity in the opinion discussed by Carol Steiker. Carol Steiker, Panetti
v. Quarterman: Is there a "Rational Understanding" of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 285 (2007).
64 Justice Kennedy did not dwell on instrumental rationales for the ban, and I will make only a
few passing observations. Regarding deterrence, Sir Edward Coke's suggestion that execution of a
madman "can be no example to others," Ford, 477 U.S. at 407, (citing E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 6
(6th ed. 1680)), is demonstrably false; it might be no example to another madman, but anything that
increases the probability of execution might enhance the deterrent effect of the death penalty.
Whatever the general deterrent force of the death penalty may be under current conditions of
enforcement, it is presumably enhanced by each execution, and might be enhanced even more by a
publicized execution of a "madman" because it might demonstrate intensity of society's resolve.
Sir William Blackstone linked the prohibition to the possibility that "had the prisoner been of
sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution." Id. at 406 (citing
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 24-25 (1769)). The possibility that an incompetent
prisoner might have raised a valid legal objection to his execution might have been a significant one
at the time Blackstone wrote his Commentaries 300 years ago when execution followed quickly after
trial. However, this possibility is remote today in light of the extensive review of death sentences
provided in both state and federal courts. Ford, 477 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring). It is
possible to allow the post-conviction challenges to proceed in most cases even if the client's abilities
to understand and assist in the proceedings are impaired (as was done in Panetti's own case). See
ABA Task Force Report, supra note 2, at sections 3(b) and 3(c), and Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Ill
Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1169
(2005).
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potential for a prisoner's recognition of the severity of the offense and
the objective of community vindication are called in question, however,
if the prisoner's mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that his
awareness of the crime and punishment has little or no relation to the
understanding of those concepts shared by the community as a whole.
This problem is not necessarily overcome once the test set forth by the
Court of Appeals is met.
The principles set forth in Ford are put at risk by a rule that
deems delusions relevant only with respect to the State's announced
reason for a punishment or the fact of an imminent execution, as opposed
to the real interests the State seeks to vindicate.65
In the quoted passage, Justice Kennedy offers two different perspectives on
the connection between a prisoner's mental condition at the time of execution and
the retributive justification for punishment-a "subjective" perspective focusing
exclusively on the prisoner's moral cognition and an "objective" perspective
focusing on the community's response to such an execution. I will address them in
reverse order:
[Execution] has the potential.., to allow the community as a whole...
to affirm its own judgment that the culpability of the prisoner is so
serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed.66
This prong of Justice Kennedy's analysis is unconvincing. If the execution
represents a reaffirmation of the community's retributive judgment (first registered
at the time of the conviction and sentence) that the offender deserves to be
executed, then why does his present mental condition have any bearing on that
judgment? Surely the moral justification for the offender's punishment (indeed,
under some views, the moral imperative of imposing it) remains grounded in the
offender's culpability at the time of the offense. If anything is being reaffirmed at
the time of execution, it is that the offender's culpable wrongdoing deserves the
death penalty. Focusing on the offender's present "culpability" (if that is the right
term) opens the door to claims of repentance, rehabilitation and current moral
worthiness that are morally irrelevant from a retributive point of view. It also
implicates the philosophically befuddling problem of identity-is the offender who
is being executed the same "person" who committed the crime? Consider the
moral basis for executing or otherwise punishing a murderer who has become
moderately or severely demented in prison. Does his loss of memory for the
offense and diminished moral agency now undermine the community's original
judgment that death is a justly deserved punishment for the offense committed by
65 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2861.
66 Id. at 2847 (emphasis added).
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the offender before he became demented? In sum, the Ford ban on executing
persons who are presently incompetent cannot plausibly rest on the "objective"
view enunciated by Justice Kennedy-that such executions would not allow the
community to "reaffirm" the original retributive judgment.
[Execution] has the6potential to make the offender recognize at last the
gravity of his crime.
This prong of Justice Kennedy's analysis implies that the retributive aim of
the punishment is realized through the convict's own moral understanding of his
wrongdoing at the time of the punishment. However compelling this claim may be
in philosophical terms, its persuasiveness is weakened by the difficulty of squaring
it with the actual practice of punishment.
First, it suggests that a criminal penalty would have no retributive force if it
were imposed on a prisoner who believes, and insists until the very end, that his
conduct was not wrongful. Such a prisoner would experience the penalty as pain
but not as deserved "punishment." Perhaps this is why Justice Kennedy stops
short of saying that subjective experience is the measure of a retributively justified
punishment-he says that the punishment is retributively justified is it "has the
potential to make the offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime."
(emphasis added) But even this formulation is problematic because it would imply
that the penalty has no retributive force if it is imposed on an offender who is
demonstrably incapable (due for example, to grave character deficits) of
acknowledging the "gravity of his crime." Execution would not even have
retributive "potential" in such cases.
Perhaps it would be better to say that, even if the offender is not capable of
recognizing that the penalty is a just response to his wrongdoing, it at least "has the
potential to make the offender recognize" the intense anger or communal rage
aroused by his wrongdoing. The offender is a 'fit" subject for punishment if he
knows or is able to know how the community views the gravity of his crime. This
characterization would justify execution of the morally blind psychopath because
carrying out the retributive act might "at last" impress upon him the depth of the
community's outrage, whether or not he is capable of empathizing with family and
friends of the victim.
This approach also implicates the important distinction drawn by Justice
Kennedy between psychopathy and psychosis. If the retributive force of execution
lies in social cognition (rather than moral cognition), the retributive goal of
punishment would not be vindicated in Panetti's case because he (if believed) was
not able to recognize the community's moral purpose in carrying out the execution.
Indeed, he thought the community's purpose in carrying out his execution had
nothing to do with his wrongdoing and was instead designed to suppress his
preaching. The mere fact that he understands the formal connection between his
67 Id. (emphasis added).
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conviction and the execution does not establish that he has a rational understanding
of the retributive aim of the execution--4.e., that it represents "punishmenf' for
murder. In short, the moral foundation of punishment is lacking in the absence of
a rational understanding of the nature and social purpose of the punishment--that
it is punishment, that it will cause pain or, in this case, death, and that it is intended
to be imposed in response to wrongdoing (and would not be imposed otherwise).
This "subjective" prong of the retributive argument does provide a plausible
grounding for both Ford and Panetti. However, it lacks generalizability: it has
some traction in the context of execution and other punishments, such as whipping,
that exact retribution in a moment of pain or horror, but it does not map well, in
my opinion, onto the standard liberty-constraining practices of criminal
punishment in the modem world, most notably imprisonment. It implies, for
example, that the time spent by a "presently incompetent" mentally ill prisoner in a
psychiatric hospital (or, let it be said, untreated in the general population) does not
"count" in retributive terms, and should not be credited toward service of his
sentence. Of course, this is not (and should not be) the law.
VII. HUMAN DIGNITY
I am personally unconvinced that the constitutional ban against executing a
"presently incompetent" mentally ill prisoner is best understood, in contemporary
terms, as being predicated on the idea that executing such a person serves no
retributive purpose. In other words, I doubt that Ford, and its elaboration in
Panetti, can be securely grounded in a bare philosophical assertion that the
execution of an incompetent prisoner doesn't "count" as "punishment."
What, then, is the most sensible contemporary rationale for this long-standing
feature of Anglo-American law? In Ford, Justice Marshall observed that the
"execution of an insane person simply offends humanity," 68 and Justice Powell
noted that it is "simply cruel" because "most men and women value the
opportunity to prepare, mentally and spiritually, for their death[s].,69 These
cryptic assertions reflect a fundamental ambiguity. Whose interests are protected
by the bar against executing the incompetent? Do we prohibit this practice
because it offends our own collective sensibilities about civilized behavior? Or do
we prohibit this practice in order to respect the dignity of the condemned prisoner?
These interests are not necessarily congruent. Consider, by way of analogy,
the trend toward supposedly more "humane" methods of execution, such as lethal
injection. It is conceivable that a prisoner may find death by this method to be
offensive to his own sense of dignity because it treats him as an object, like a dog
being put to sleep; he may prefer to die by firing squad or on the gallows. When
we sterilize the act of execution, do we do it for ourselves or for the prisoner?
68 Ford, 477 U.S. at 407-08.
69 Id. at 421.
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If it is for us, the ban is rooted in the "ugh" factor-a squeamish reluctance to
sully the dignity of the law by carrying out society's most powerful expression of
condemnation on a child or a confused and incoherent madman. Executing a
madman may have struck many spectators as a "cruel spectacle" when executions
were public events. But now even the most delusional prisoner will be put to sleep
rather than being held down under the blade of the axe. Today, it is the very idea
of executing any human being that arouses disgust for many people, which is one
reason why supporters of the practice have tried so hard to sanitize it and keep it
out of public view. By avoiding the "cruel spectacle," however, these changes also
reduce the emotional costs of carrying out executions, including the marginal cost
of executing a madman.
If this prohibition has any continuing justification in the contemporary
context, I believe it must be found in respect for the dignity of the condemned.
The prisoner has a right, even under imminent sentence of death, to be treated as a
person, worthy of respect, not as an object of the State's effort to carry out its
promises. As Justice Powell suggested, a person under the shadow of death should
have the opportunity to make the few choices that remain available to him. He
should have the opportunity to decide who should be present at his execution, what
he will eat for his last meal, what, if anything, he will utter for his last words, and
whether he will repent or go defiantly to his grave. A prisoner who does not
understand the nature and purpose of the execution is not able to exercise the
choices that remain to him. To execute him in this condition is an affront to his
dignity as a person and to the "dignity of man," the core value of the Eighth
Amendment.7 °
A "thin' veneer of formal understanding, which would be sufficient under the
Fifth Circuit's test,7' is insufficient to respect the offender's dignity as a person.
72
"Rational understanding" or "appreciation" of the nature and purpose of the
punishment in the prisoner's own case is a satisfactory formulation of the "test" for
competence to be executed.73 In Panetti's case, the record suggests that his
competence for execution may have been impaired in more than one respect. First,
by obscuring the State's purpose in executing him, his delusions may make him
70 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
71 Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815 (5th Cir. 2006).
72 Under Kantian theory, punishment has no retributive force unless the person on whom it is
carried out is a rational moral agent. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS,
(Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). Although this is not the retributive theory
enunciated by Justice Kennedy, it is congruent with my use of "respect for persons" as a limiting
principle on otherwise justified punishment, whatever the theory ofjustification for that punishment.
73 Under paragraph 3(a) of the ABA Recommendation, "A sentence of death should not be
carried out if the prisoner has a mental disorder or disability that significantly impairs his or her
capacity ... (iii) to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment, or to appreciate the reason
for its imposition in the prisoner's own case." Recommendations of the American Bar Association
Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death
Penalty, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1115, 1115 (2005).
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unable to choose whether to accept responsibility for his wrongdoing; this is the
feature of his condition that is implicated by the Fifth Circuit's ruling. However,
his symptoms also probably impair his competence to be executed in another
respect: his pervasive thought disorder probably prevents him from appreciating
(beyond transient, momentary recognition) the permanent and solemn reality of
execution. It is important to emphasize that the necessary understanding is about
the finality of death, not about the possibility of a new or different "life" after
death.
A person (whether or not mentally ill) who is confused or uncertain about the
"afterlife" is, of course, not incompetent to be executed on that account-few of us
would be competent for execution if that were so. Nor is a person who is certain
that there is life after death incompetent to be executed on that account, even if he
is also mentally ill. Competence for execution does not require the ability to
"make peace with his or her Maker" 74 or a desire or willingness to do so.
However, a person whose mental illness precludes meaningful recognition of death
as a marker between the "before" and the "after" is not competent to be executed.75
In Walton v. Johnson,76 the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, grappled with what
Ford entails regarding the prisoner's understanding of what it means to die. The
evidence showed that Percy Walton has borderline intelligence and is suffering
from a severe mental disorder, probably schizophrenia. Although he was able to
acknowledge that he was going to be "executed" and was going to "die," his
statements that he expected to have a job at Burger King, and go to the shopping
mall, after his execution raised a significant doubt regarding whether he had a
meaningful understanding of what it means "to die." Six of the Fourth Circuit's
judges would have remanded the case to the district court for a finding on whether
Walton knew that his execution "will mean the end of his physical life. 77
However, a seven-judge majority was unwilling to adopt any constitutional
74 C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the Ethics of Death Row
Volunteering, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 849, 852 n.4 (2000). In Ford, according to Hawles, it is
uncharitable to dispatch an offender "into another world when he is not of a capacity to fit himself for
it." 477 U.S. at 419 (citing Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 How. ST. TR.
474, 477 (1685)).
75 The ABA report put the issue this way:
[T]he offender should also have a meaningful understanding of what it means to be
dead-in the sense that life is terminated and that the prisoner will not be "waking up" or
otherwise continuing his existence. Deficient understanding of what it means to be dead
can be associated with mental retardation and with delusional beliefs symptomatic of
severe mental illness. These profound deficiencies in understanding associated with
mental disability should not be trivialized or ignored by analogizing them to widely
shared uncertainty among normal persons about the existence of some form of spiritual
"life" after death or about the possibility of resurrection.
Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL
& PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668, 676 (2006).
76 440 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2006).
71 Id. at 191.
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measure of what a condemned prisoner must understand for fear of drawing the
courts into scrutinizing the rationality of spiritual and religious beliefs about what
happens after one dies. As judge Wilkins said in his dissenting opinion, however,
the mere ability to say the words "execution" and "die" does not manifest even the
most rudimentary understanding of the finality of death, and defining death as the
end of one's physical existence for Ford purposes implies nothing one way or the
other regarding the possibility of reincarnation or a spiritual afterlife.7 8
Another puzzle regarding the meaning of incompetence to be executed under
Ford is what it means to be aware of the punishment one is "about to suffer."
Consider the problem posed in Thompson v. Bell,79 now pending in the Sixth
Circuit.8 ° Uncontested evidence shows that Gregory Thompson suffers from
severe mental illness with psychotic features and that he experiences multiple
delusions, including a fixed belief that his conviction will be set aside and that he
will not be executed. Even so, he recognizes that he has been convicted and
sentenced to death for murder. The Tennessee courts as well as the federal district
court concluded that he is "aware of his impeding execution and the reason for it,"
as required by Ford, and that his delusional belief that the execution will not be
carried out is irrelevant to his competence for execution under Ford.81
Thompson relies heavily on Justice Powell's observation in Ford that "only if
the defendant is aware that his death is approaching can he prepare himself for his
passing."8 2  Although the district court properly ruled that "ability to prepare
oneself mentally and spiritually for one's death" is not part of the "test" for
competence to be executed under Ford,83 Justice Powell's observation highlights
why it is important to assure that the condemned prisoner is aware of the
punishment that he is "about to suffer" before he is executed.8 4 A prisoner who is
so deluded that he is certain that he will not be executed, even on the eve of the
scheduled execution, is unaware of his mortal peril; executing him in this condition
would be equivalent to executing a mentally ill prisoner who believes that he, the
78 Id. at 183.
79 Thompson v. Bell, No. 1:04-CV-177, 2006 WL 1195892 (E.D. Tenn. May 4, 2006)
(memorandum opinion dismissing petition for writ of habeas corpus).
80 Thompson v. Bell, No. 06-5770 (6th Cir. June 19, 2007) (order granting a Certificate of
Appealability on whether enactment of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 39 is an extraordinary
circumstance significant enough to reopen Thompson's original habeas petition).
81 See Thompson v. Bell, No. 1:04-CV-177, 2006 WL 1195892 (E.D. Tenn. May 4, 2006);
Thompson v. State, 134 S.W.3d 168 (Tenn. 2004).
82 Thompson, 2006 WL at *22 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986)).
83 Id. at *22-23. See also Walton v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 2006) (competence
for execution did not require that prisoner have capacity to prepare himself mentally and spiritually
for death).
84 Even the Tennessee Supreme Court's formulation of the Ford test requires that the offender
be aware of his "impending execution." Thompson v. Bell, No. 1:04-CV- 177, 2006 WL 1195892, at
*7 (E.D. Tenn. May 4, 2006) (citing Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 266 (Tenn. 1999)).
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executioner, the witnesses and all other participants are playing their assigned parts
in a dramatic performance, pretending to carry out an execution.
Having said this, however, I do not mean to imply that unrealistic hopes of
judicial or gubernatorial intervention, or even divine intervention, render a prisoner
incompetent for execution. Thompson's incapacity to recognize the fact of his
impending execution reveals a gross misunderstanding of reality attributable to
severe mental illness, not the wishful thinking of a typically hopeful prisoner faced
with imminent execution.
One advantage of the approach suggested here is that it clarifies Ford's
conceptual location in the doctrinal landscape of the Eighth Amendment. At least
three possibilities can be imagined. First, Justice Marshall's opinion in Ford
implies that the common-law ban on executing presently incompetent prisoners
falls in the category of punishments, such as breaking on the wheel, drawing and
quartering, and the rack and thumbscrew that have long been forbidden because
they are cruel or barbaric.85 However, this categorization is imperfect because the
"cruelty" of execution in this context lies not in the punishment itself but in the
barbarity of imposing it on particular prisoners. 6 The emphasis on retribution in
Ford and Panetti suggests a second doctrinal possibility-the ban on executing
incompetent prisoners may amount to unconstitutionally excessive or
disproportionate punishment, analogous to the imposition of the death penalty on
offenders who were convicted of rape,87 lacked sufficient culpability at the time of
the offense,88 who were under 18 at the time of the offense,89 or who are mentally
retarded.90 This analogy is problematic, of course, because a death sentence is not
excessive in relation to the seriousness of Panetti's crime and the Court never
raises any question regarding his culpability at the time of offense.91 Is the Court
85 See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
86 For those forms of punishment banned at the time the Constitution was adopted, there is no
need to address contemporary values. However, the Court has also held that the Eighth Amendment
bans forms of punishment that were accepted at the time of its adoption if they now contravene the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a civilized society," such as deprivation of
citizenship. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Eighth Amendment may also be
understood to carry forward well-established limitations on punishment, whatever they are, but the
ban on executing incompetent prisoners, even though well-established, might require a contemporary
justification in light of the many safeguards that now prevent hasty executions. Even if no
contemporary justification is needed to ground the common-law ban in the Eighth Amendment, the
scope of the ban must be rooted in contemporary values, as Justice Kennedy implicitly recognized in
Panetti. See generally Panetti v Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
87 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
88 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,
157-58 (1987).
89 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
90 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
91 Anyone familiar with Panetti's psychiatric history might well conclude that his severe
mental illness significantly impaired his ability to exercise rational control over his behavior at the
time of the murders, and that the death penalty is disproportionate to his culpability. See ABA
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holding that imposition of an otherwise permitted punishment on a deserving
offender can become excessive if it no longer serves a "proper purpose" at the time
of execution?92 However, even if executing incompetent prisoners does not serve a
retributive purpose, Justice Kennedy never discusses the possibility that it could
serve a deterrent purpose.93
The most persuasive approach is a straightforward "limiting principle"
rationale-that even if it could be otherwise justified on deterrent, incapacitative,
or even retributive grounds, executing presently incompetent prisoners is banned
by the Eighth Amendment as a violation of human dignity-as a violation of the
prisoner's right to be treated with respect as an individual person and not, as I said
above, as a mere object of the State's effort to carry out its promises. 94 There is
much in Justice Marshall's rhetoric in Ford to support this view and it can be
anchored securely in the core value of the Eighth Amendment95 and the
fundamental principle of respect for persons that underlies the capital defendant's
right to an individualized judgment regarding the suitability of the death penalty in
his case.96 Nor does this approach require a commitment to any particular theory
of retribution.
VIII. COSTS AND BENEFITS
However persuasive the argument for withholding execution of incompetent
prisoners might be, the benefits of recognizing and administering such an
exemption97 might be offset by its costs. I doubt that there is a significant risk of
Recommendation, supra note 2, at 1. However, the sole issue before the Court concerns Panetti's
mental condition at the time of execution, not his culpability at the time of the offense.
92 Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2860 (2007).
93 See Steiker, supra note 63. As Professor Steiker points out, the Court has vacillated wildly
in its methodology in the line of cases addressing claims that the death penalty is disproportionate to
the seriousness of the offense or the culpability of the offender.
9' One puzzle is whether the right may be waived. Presumably, the answer is yes. The
prisoner has a right under the Eighth Amendment not to be executed while incompetent, but a
condemned prisoner might say, in advance, while competent, that he would prefer to be executed
while incompetent. Under the approach outlined in the text, the right would be waivable. However,
under a strongly retributive rationale, the purpose of the punishment would not be served by
executing the incompetent person, and it should be forbidden. Morally speaking, the competent
prisoner may actually have a right to be executed, but the prisoner has neither a moral nor a legal
right to be executed while incompetent.
95 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.").
96 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell
& Stevens, JJ.)
97 I will assume that the sentence of a person found by a court to be incompetent for execution
will be commuted, as required in Maryland and as recommended by the ABA and companion
organizations. Commutation avoids the unseemly effort to medicate a prisoner for the sole purpose
of enabling the State to execute him. I have discussed this problem in Richard J. Bonnie, Healing-
Killing Conflicts, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, May/June 1990, at 12.
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fabrication in this setting. It is almost certain that the prisoners whose claims
receive a hard look will be offenders similar to Panetti-those with a history of
severe mental disorder, whose diagnoses are uncontested, and who manifest acute
symptoms of cognitive disorganization, hallucinations, or delusions. Although
there is some risk of exaggerated symptoms, the dispute, as in Panetti, will usually
concern the application of the legal standard to genuine impairments. It is possible
that the "rational understanding" test, admittedly less determinate than a "formal
understanding" test, will invite more claims and will lead to exemption in "too
many" cases. I doubt that this will occur; very few claims are likely to be
vindicated.
For purposes of argument, though, let us suppose that execution competence
claims become a commonplace "last resorf' for condemned prisoners who have
any history of mental illness. That would surely increase the costs. Is it worth the
effort?
The answer is decidedly yes. However, I would not rest my case exclusively
on the offense to human dignity of executing presently incompetent prisoners. I
think a stronger argument is that the Ford exemption provides a safety valve for
correcting injustice at trial. Jurors all too often seem to discount mitigating claims
of mental illness in the face of the intensity or brutality that may be associated with
homicidal violence by mentally disordered offenders, and they may actually regard
mental illness as an aggravating factor. Proportionality review of death sentences,
as currently practiced in most states, fails to correct these distortions. Moreover, as
Panetti's case shows, severely disturbed defendants often subvert all of the
procedural safeguards our system affords them, frustrating or angering judges,
prosecutors and jurors in the process. Viewed from this perspective, execution
competence determinations provide a final judicial outlet for remedying mistakes
in capital adjudications.
IX. A GLIMMER OF LIGHT?
I return to the questions raised at the beginning of this paper. Viewed simply
as a case about the proper test for assessing a prisoner's competence for execution,
Panetti is not particularly important. Its attraction lies mainly in the opportunity to
explore the reasons for exempting mentally ill prisoners from execution, a topic of
interest exclusively to criminal law professors. However, Panetti also exposes two
more substantial problems that should be of interest to everyone interested in the
fair administration of the death penalty. One is the failure of the criminal justice
system to take proper account of the effects of severe mental illness in capital
adjudications, specifically by failing to assure a fair defense for defendants with
mental disabilities, by failing to give morally appropriate mitigating effect to
claims of diminished responsibility at the time of the crime, and by failing to
correct these deficiencies in post-conviction proceedings. Those appalling failures
are amply documented in Panetti.
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An even larger problem exposed by the Panetti litigation is the failure of the
Supreme Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence. When a majority of the
Supreme Court opted to reaffirm the constitutionality of capital punishment in
1976, it set out to develop and administer an aggressive "death is different"
jurisprudence. As that effort continues to unfold, it is characterized by a rich body
of principles and doctrines, together with an understandable unwillingness to
enforce them aggressively by backstopping state courts, and by a Byzantine body
of habeas law that insulates state court judgments from collateral attack.
Successful implementation of capital sentencing jurisprudence depends on
aggressive efforts by state appellate courts to enforce the values and principles
articulated by the Supreme Court as "the supreme law of the land." While some
state appellate courts have taken this responsibility seriously, others, such as the
appellate courts of Texas, have not.98 The Texas courts failed miserably here, right
from the beginning of the pretrial process and all the way through the second post-
conviction proceedings. Yet, Panetti's death sentence would have been carried out
if Justice Kennedy had followed his usual inclination to defer to state courts.
Four Justices are clearly not willing to abandon the Court's Eighth
Amendment project. It so happens that Justice Kennedy joined them here. The
key question is "Why?" I suspect that Justice Kennedy joined the "liberal' wing in
this case because he recognizes, as the four dissenters may not, that the case
reflected an utter disregard for the constitutional principles designed to take into
account the clinical realities of severe mental illness---to prevent gross injustice at
trial and inhumanity on death row. Whether this case reflects a glimmer of light in
the darkness remains to be seen.
98 See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007); Smith v. Texas, 127 S. Ct.
1686 (2007); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
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